Tactical voting

  • in voting methods, tactical voting (or strategic voting, sophisticated voting or insincere voting) occurs in elections with more than two candidates, when a voter supports another candidate more strongly than their sincere preference in order to prevent an undesirable outcome.[1]

    for example, in a simple plurality election, a voter might gain a "better" outcome by voting for a less preferred but more generally popular candidate.

    it has been shown by the gibbard–satterthwaite theorem that any single-winner ranked voting method which is not dictatorial must be susceptible to tactical voting. however, the type of tactical voting and the extent to which it affects campaigns and election results can vary dramatically from one voting method to another.

    for example for single-winner elections, majority judgment (mj) claims to reduce by almost "half" the incentives and opportunities successfully to vote tactically in the ways described in the next section. firstly, mj does this by inviting citizens not to rank the candidates but to grade their suitability for office: excellent (ideal), very good, good, acceptable, poor, or reject (entirely unsuitable). secondly, the mj winner is the one who has received the highest median-grade.

    for multi-winner elections, evaluative proportional representation (epr) in section 5.5.5 in proportional representation further reduces tactical voting by assuring each citizen that their honest vote will proportionately increase the voting power of the elected candidate in the legislature who receives either their highest grade, remaining highest grade, or proxy vote.

  • types of tactical voting
  • examples in real elections
  • rational voter model
  • pre-election influence
  • views on tactical voting
  • influence of voting method
  • in particular methods
  • tactical unwind
  • see also
  • references
  • resources
  • external links

In voting methods, tactical voting (or strategic voting, sophisticated voting or insincere voting) occurs in elections with more than two candidates, when a voter supports another candidate more strongly than their sincere preference in order to prevent an undesirable outcome.[1]

For example, in a simple plurality election, a voter might gain a "better" outcome by voting for a less preferred but more generally popular candidate.

It has been shown by the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem that any single-winner ranked voting method which is not dictatorial must be susceptible to tactical voting. However, the type of tactical voting and the extent to which it affects campaigns and election results can vary dramatically from one voting method to another.

For example for single-winner elections, majority judgment (MJ) claims to reduce by almost "half" the incentives and opportunities successfully to vote tactically in the ways described in the next Section. Firstly, MJ does this by inviting citizens not to rank the candidates but to grade their suitability for office: Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject (entirely unsuitable). Secondly, the MJ winner is the one who has received the highest median-grade.

For multi-winner elections, Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR) in Section 5.5.5 in proportional representation further reduces tactical voting by assuring each citizen that their honest vote will proportionately increase the voting power of the elected candidate in the legislature who receives either their highest grade, remaining highest grade, or proxy vote.